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RECENT DECISIONS
Agency -

Scope of Employment -

Effect of Employee's Devia-

from a Prescribed Route on Liability of Employer - Plaintiff recovered a judgment for damages to her car from the defendant public
utility company. The damages were caused by the negligence of the
defendant's employee, a meter reader. The defendant's employee had
picked up several other meter readers in a company car and had left his
prescribed route in violation of company rules. The employee-driver
was returning to his route when the accident occurred. Held: Judgment
for plaintiff reversed. The employee-driver was not using the automobile for the benefit of his employer and was not on his employer's
business when the accident occurred, therefore he was not within the
scope of his employment. Skapura et al. v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 100 N.E. (2d) 700 (Ohio App., 1950).
Ohio, in effect has a "control test" for deciding whether or not an
employee is within the scope of his employment when driving his employer's auto.' This test seemingly puts an employee outside the scope
of his employment whenever he leaves a route prescribed by the employer without regard either to time or distance. The Ohio Court's
question is, did the employee leave his employer's control (i.e., the route
as prescribed by the employer) ?2 This is a very strict application of the
common law rule that the owner of an automobile is not liable for
damages caused by a servant acting outside the scope of his employment.3 However, the Ohio Court does recognize that a reasonable inference may be drawn that the employee is the agent of the employer
where the automobile is owned by the employer.4 This inference is
easily rebutted. Even a slight deviation from a prescribed route by an
employee will take him out of his scope of employment.
A similar result is reached in Arkansas where it has been held that
when an employee steps aside from the employer's business for any
purpose of his own, and for however short a time, the employee is,
while he is acting for himself, outside the scope of his employment
The test applied by the several state courts are varied with regard to
when an employee is without the scope of his employment or when an
employee leaves the scope of his employment or returns to it. In a
1 Senn. v. Lachner, 100 N.E. 2d 419 (Ohio, 1950): "Was the salesman (employee)

acting under the direction of the defendant (employer) at the time of the
collision?" cf. Rogers v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 153 Ohio St. 513,
92 N.E. (2d) 677 (1950).
2 Senn v. Lachner, supra, note 1.
3 Gemma v. Rotondo, 62 R.I. 293, 5 A. (2d) 297, 122 A.L.R. 223 (1939).
4 Supra, note 2.
5 Sweeden v. Atkinson Improvement Co., 93 Ark. 402, 125 S.W. 439 (1910);
Healy v. Cockrill, 133 Ark. 377, 202 S.W. 229 (1918); Carter Truck Line v.
Gibson, 195 Ark. 994, 115 S.W. (2d) 270 (1938).
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Louisiana case 6 the defendant's truck driver was operating a delivery
truck at an excessive rate of speed when an accident occurred. The defendant alleged that had the driver followed the direct route in making
the deliveries, the driver could not have been where he was when the
accident occurred. The driver alleged that he was returning to his employer's store when the accident took place. The Louisiana Court held
that where an employee leaves the scope of his employment for his own
benefit, it is not necessary for him to return absolutely to the zone or
territory of his employment, but he need only to be returning to such
zone or territory of employment to re-enter the scope of his employment. This rule would, if applied to the instant case, change the result
of the appeal, for the employee in the main case was, in fact, returning
to the route prescribed by his employer.
Only the courts of the State of Washington seem to use any kind
of a distance measure to determine whether or not the employee is
within the scope of his employment. In a case involving an employee's
use of his employer's delivery truck, though with general instructions,
without permission to use it for purely personal purposes, the Washington Court laid down a test that involved the amount of deviation as
compared to the whole trip the employee'is to make. 7 The court in effect
said that a deviation of a few blocks in a trip of several miles may not
take the employee outside the scope of his employment, while a deviation
of several blocks in a trip of only a few blocks may do so. There is no
hard and fast rule as to a particular ratio that either is or is not scope of
employment, but the individual facts and surrounding circumstances
along with this rule would seem to be an aid to the court.8 Under such
a rule, the employee may have deviated slightly from his prescribed
route and still be within his scope of employment. It would not be
difficult to find a situation where an injured plaintiff would have better
protection under this rule.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has laid down a rather unique test
or method for deciding whether or not, in a particular case, the employee
was within the scope of his employment. In a case in which this test
was applied,9 the plaintiff "Red Cap" was escorting a woman from a
railroad station to a taxi. The plaintiff took the women to a taxi which
was occupied by one other person and the woman refused to enter the
taxi. The woman directed the plaintiff to another taxi. The driver of
the first taxi became angry at the loss of the fare and assaulted the
Cusimano v. A. S. Spiess Sales Co., 153 La. 551, 96 So. 118, 45 A.L.R. 487
(1923) ; Glass v. Wise, 155 La. 477, 99 So. 409 (1923).
v. Goodman, 22 Wash. (2d) 583, 157 P. (2d) 326 (1945).
Supra, note 7.
9 Linden v. City Car Co., 239 Wis. 236, 300 N.W. 925 (1941).
See also Fultz v. Lange, 238 Wis. 342, 298 N.W. 60 (1941).
6

7
Leuthold
8
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plaintiff. The Wisconsin test, which may well be called the "intent test,"
was put this way by Justice Wickhem:
"... The test (for scope of employment) is whether the servant
has stepped aside from the business of his principal to accomplish
an independent purpose of his own, or whether he was actuated
by an intent to carry out his employment and to serve his
master."' 0
In the application of this test, an employee could, in fact have deviated
from the route prescribed by his employer, and still be within the scope
of his employment. There is the possibility that by applying this test to
the case under discussion, a different result could have been possible.
Assume that the driver of a car owned by his employer aids another
employee in the completion of that other employee's duties. That might
well be done with the intent to aid the employer, and yet in fact be a
deviation from a prescribed route. This test, in application at least, does
not automatically put an employee outside the scope of his employment
for any deviation which would be the result from a strict application of
the common law rule." The Wisconsin rule appears to lend itself to
wide application without strain or hardship on the parties.
A rule that puts an employee outside the scope of his employment
where there is any deviation is a harsh one and should not be extended.
The Restatement of Agency'12 states that if the servant is actuated by the
purpose to serve his master's business to any appreciable extent, the
master should be subject to liability. This rule would, it seems, give a
result similar to the rules of Wisconsin and Washington. The Restatement rule would seem to be a better rule than the one applied in the
instant case. Naturally, where there is a clear and certain deviation
from the scope of his employment that is more than a slight deviation,
and such deviation in no way benefits the employer, the employer should
not be held.
HARoLD M. FRAUENDORFER

Constitutional Law - Church and State - Validity of "Released Time" Program -Petitioners, parents of public school children, brought this proceeding to compel the Board of Education of
the City of New York to halt the released time program for religious
education in the public schools of New York City. This program permitted parents to withdraw their children from the public school for one
hour per week to receive religious instruction. Petitioners, who did not
avail themselves of the program and were in no wise obliged to do so,
challenged the constitutionality of the released time program on the
' 0 Linden v. City Car Co., supra, note 9.
"'Supra,note 3.
'12RETATEMENT, AGENCY, Sec. 236, Comment (b).

